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INTRODUCTION 
Climate change threatens to displace as many as 200 million 
people internally and across national borders by the middle of the 
twenty-first century.1 Unpredictable climate, increased frequency of 
natural disasters, and rising sea levels are forcing people throughout 
the world in vulnerable regions to leave their homes in search of safer 
ground.2 
Indigenous peoples are among the most vulnerable to these 
changes. Climate change poses not only a threat to their property, but 
also a threat to their way of life.3 Indigenous peoples are tied to their 
lands religiously and culturally, and for basic necessities.4 A loss of 
their land could result in a loss of their identity and eventual loss of 
                                                                                                                 
* Professor of Law and Director, Center for International Law and Justice, Florida 
A&M University College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges valuable 
research assistance from Stacy Fallon, Annie Wilkinson, Joanna Milleson, Kristen 
King, and Danielle Murray in preparing this article. 
 1. Holly D. Lange, Climate Refugees Require Relocation Assistance: 
Guaranteeing Adequate Land Assets Through Treaties Based on the National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 613, 613 (2010). 
 2. See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The 
Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1635–1646 (2007). 
 3. Id. at 1640, 1645–46. 
 4. Id. at 1645–46. 
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their lives.5 Indigenous peoples are also vulnerable because many 
indigenous communities do not have the funds to protect themselves 
from the harsh effects of climate change.6 Moreover, in the event that 
their land becomes uninhabitable due to the effects of climate 
change, they lack the resources to relocate their community.7 
This struggle is underway in the Native Village of Kivalina. This 
village of approximately 400 residents is located approximately 
seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle on a thin strip of land 
precariously positioned between the Chukchi Sea and a lagoon in 
Northwest Alaska.8 In 2006, the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) projected that Kivalina would be completely lost 
due to erosion in ten to fifteen years.9 With the loss of their village 
rapidly approaching, the residents of Kivalina are captives in their 
homeland bracing for disaster because they do not have the millions 
of dollars10 needed to relocate and there is no government fund or 
process in place to provide them with adequate assistance.11 
                                                                                                                 
 5. Id. 
 6. E. Rania Rampersad, Indigenous Adaptation to Climate Change: Preserving 
Sustainable Relationships through an Environmental Stewardship Claim & Trust 
Fund Remedy, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 591, 594 (2009). See also GLENN 
GRAY & ASSOCIATES FOR THE CITY OF KIVALINA, SITUATION ASSESSMENT: 
KIVALINA CONSENSUS BUILDING PROJECT 6 (July 2010), http://www.relocate-
ak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Situation_Assessment_Final_July_
20105.pdf [hereinafter SITUATION ASSESSMENT]. 
 7. For a comprehensive discussion of the impacts of climate change on 
indigenous peoples and the potential legal remedies available to address the 
challenges that they face, see generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann 
Kronk eds., 2013). 
 8. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
 9. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ALASKA DIST., ALASKA VILLAGE 
EROSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 21–25 (2006), http://www4.nau.edu/
tribalclimatechange/resources/docs/res_USArmyCorpEngAKVillErosionTechAssis
tProg.pdf [hereinafter ASSISTANCE PROGRAM]. 
 10. The estimated cost of relocating the village has ranged between 100 and 400 
million dollars. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-142, ALASKA 
NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW 
QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 32 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 GAO REPORT]. 
 11. Christine Shearer, Relocating Alaskan Natives: The Climate Is Changing 
Faster than Disaster Management and Adaptation Policies, THINKPROGRESS (July 
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There are five potential sources of relief for Kivalina and similarly 
situated vulnerable indigenous communities: (1) an international 
community response, likely connected to a post-Kyoto climate 
change agreement; (2) a U.S. government response; (3) a state 
government response; (4) climate change litigation in U.S. courts; 
and (5) a private sector-funded relocation fund. 
Although a climate change fund exists at the international level, 
known as the “Green Climate Fund,”12 resources in this fund are 
provided by developed nations and are applied exclusively to 
enhancing climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in 
developing nations.13 The United States is not a developing nation 
eligible for such funds. Therefore, the Native Village of Kivalina 
must rely on the U.S. government or the Alaska state government for 
relocation assistance because it is not eligible for assistance from the 
international community. 
The U.S. government can and should take a more proactive role in 
addressing climate change adaptation and the potentially devastating 
consequences that climate change impacts will have on vulnerable 
populations in high-risk areas. The highest priority vulnerable 
population for the government should be federally recognized tribes, 
like the Native Village of Kivalina. The federal government has a 
treaty-based trust relationship that requires the federal government to 
vigorously protect these tribes’ interests and protect them from 
harm.14 Unfortunately, as of this writing, Kivalina’s efforts to seek 
assistance from the federal government and the government of 
Alaska have failed to provide the funding necessary for relocation.15 
                                                                                                                 
21, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/07/21/275552/alaska-
climate-adaptation. 
 12. See generally GREEN CLIMATE FUND, http://gcfund.net/home.html (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
 13. See Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties, 17th Sess., Mar. 15, 2012, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 63, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a
01.pdf. 
 14. See generally NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2006) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]. 
 15. But see Press Release, Office of Governor Sean Parnell, Funding Proposed 
for Kivalina Evacuation Road (Mar. 20, 2013), http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell/press-
room/full-press-release.html?pr=6398 ($2.5 million capital budget amendment 
submitted by Alaska governor to legislature that seeks to authorize development of 
an eight-mile evacuation and access road for the Native Village of Kivalina). 
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As a last resort, the Native Village of Kivalina attempted to secure 
funds necessary for relocation by asserting a federal common law 
public nuisance claim in a lawsuit against several large corporations 
responsible for emitting significant quantities of greenhouse gases.16 
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that Kivalina lacked standing to bring its claim and 
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because it was a 
non-justiciable political question.17 Three years later, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of 
Kivalina’s claim, holding that public nuisance claims based on 
federal common law are displaced by the Clean Air Act,18 leaving the 
residents of the Native Village of Kivalina with no recovery and little 
hope for an alternate legal theory to support their claim.19 
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Kivalina residents and 
other similarly situated federally recognized tribes facing the threat 
of displacement from climate change impacts are at a loss for 
assistance. A new climate change adaptation remedy is urgently 
needed in the United States to establish a relocation fund that would 
provide proactive relocation funding to these communities that are 
most vulnerable and in need of assistance. The resources for such a 
fund could be derived at least in part from a carbon tax on private 
sector entities, comparable to the funding mechanism that generated 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863, 868 
(N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006). 
 19. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 868–69 (9th 
Cir. 2012). Other creative and desperate efforts to use the court system as a 
possible vehicle for relief for climate change impacts in Alaska continue as of this 
writing. In 2012, an Alaska teenager sued the state for loss of permafrost in his 
backyard. The suit is premised on the atmospheric trust doctrine and alleges that 
the state is not fulfilling its public trust duty to protect atmospheric resources in the 
state by failing to adequately regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the state. The 
superior court dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Alaska. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., Alaska Youth Pursue 
Climate Case (Nov. 16, 2012), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/12-11-
16%20AK%20Press%20Release%20.pdf; Salvatore Cardoni, Teen Sues Alaska 
Because Climate Change Is Melting His Backyard, TAKE PART (Mar. 18, 2013), 
http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/03/18/teenager-sues-alaska-because-climate-
change-melting-away-his-hometown. 
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the “Superfund” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).20 
Part I of this article describes the factual context of the Kivalina 
litigation and how the disappointing outcome in the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in this case sets the stage for the need for a climate change 
relocation fund. Part II examines existing sources of federal authority 
for relocation under U.S. law and how they could serve as a 
conceptual foundation for a climate change relocation fund. Part III 
considers comparative law perspectives on proactive relocation 
responses to impending natural disasters and the use of private sector 
financed climate change adaptation funds. Part IV proposes possible 
models for a climate change relocation fund in the United States and 
recommends that the availability of the fund be limited to federally 
recognized tribes.21 
I. THE KIVALINA LITIGATION: CASE STUDY IN THE NEED FOR A 
RELOCATION FUND 
The Native Village of Kivalina is a self-governing, federally 
recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans. The Kivalina coast is 
composed of sea ice, which acts as a barrier for the small village 
against coastal storms and waves.22 In the past decade, storms have 
caused the loss of approximately 100 feet from the Kivalina 
coastline.23 Homes and buildings are in imminent danger of falling 
                                                                                                                 
 20. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 21. There are two categories of indigenous nations in the United States. The 
first group is those that have been federally recognized by Congress. Congress has 
the ability to recognize certain indigenous nations under the U.S. Constitution’s 
Indian Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. By virtue of being federally 
recognized, these indigenous nations possess certain rights and responsibilities that 
non-federally recognized nations do not possess. See generally COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra note 14. The list of federally recognized tribes is available at 77 
Fed. Reg. 47,868 (Aug. 10, 2012). The second group is those that have not been 
federally recognized and, therefore, do not have access to the same privileges and 
legal principles applicable to federally recognized tribes. 
 22. CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA: A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 15 (2011). 
 23. Id. at 14–15. 
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into the sea and critical infrastructure is threatened with permanent 
destruction.24 
The progressive reduction of the protective sea ice in Kivalina has 
rendered the island uninhabitable and has prompted a thorough 
investigation of prospects for relocation in the immediate future. In 
2003, the USACE and the United States Government Accountability 
Office predicted that a dangerous combination of storm activity 
“could flood the entire village at any time.”25 A decade later, the 
inhabitants of Kivalina continue to live in fear of being destroyed by 
the effects of climate change and remain unable to afford the millions 
of dollars in relocation costs necessary to reestablish the community 
in a safer location. 
With no available options under federal or state law to ensure the 
safety of their future, the Native Village of Kivalina and the City of 
Kivalina (plaintiffs) filed a federal common law public nuisance 
claim against twenty-two major oil, energy, and utility companies to 
seek damages for the costs of relocating their community of 
approximately 400 residents.26 The plaintiffs alleged that these 
defendants were “substantial contributors to global warming,”27 and 
that the greenhouse gas emissions from these companies exacerbated 
sea level rise and ultimately contributed to increased coastal erosion 
that destroyed part of their village and will require relocation of 
Kivalina’s residents.28 The plaintiffs also claimed that these 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil 
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2010), No. 09-17490. 
 25. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 32. 
 26. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th 
Cir. 2012). The defendants are: (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP 
America, Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) Chevron Corporation; (6) 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7) ConocoPhillips Company; (8) Royal Dutch Shell PLC; 
(9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy Corporation; (11) The AES 
Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Company, Inc.; (13) American Electric 
Power Services Corporation; (14) Duke Energy Corporation; (15) DTE Energy 
Company; (16) Edison International; (17) Midamerican Energy Holdings 
Company; (18) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (19) The Southern Company; 
(20) Dynegy Holdings, Inc.; (21) Xcel Energy, Inc.; and (22) Genon Energy, Inc. 
 27. Id. at 854. 
 28. Id. at 853–54. 
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companies were “conspiring to mislead the public about the science 
of global warming.”29 
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California dismissed the case because the plaintiffs lacked standing30 
and because the dispute was non-justiciable under the political 
question doctrine.31 In a 3-0 decision, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on federal displacement 
reasoning to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ 
claims.32 The court concluded that regardless of whether Kivalina 
could assert a valid public nuisance claim against the defendants, 
“[i]f Congress has addressed a federal issue by statute, then there is 
no gap for federal common law to fill.”33 Relying on the 2011 U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in American Electric Power Co. v. 
Connecticut,34 the court held that if a statute (in this instance, the 
Clean Air Act) directly addresses the issue in dispute, federal 
common law claims are barred.35 
Options in the U.S. court system for the Kivalina plaintiffs are now 
extremely limited and unlikely to succeed. They can appeal to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which is unlikely to hear the case in the absence 
of a split in the circuits.36 They can also file a new case in state court 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Id. at 854. A discussion of the civil conspiracy claim is beyond the scope of 
this article. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. The political question doctrine refers to matters that federal courts will 
not adjudicate because they are inappropriate for judicial review. ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (3d ed. 2009). The doctrine is supported 
by separation of powers principles in that it “minimizes judicial intrusion into the 
operations of the other branches of government and that it allocates decisions to the 
branches of government that have superior expertise in particular areas.” Id. 
 32. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853. 
 33. Id. at 856. 
 34. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011). 
 35. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition for 
rehearing en banc with the Ninth Circuit. On November 27, 2012, the Ninth Circuit 
denied the petition in a two-sentence decision: “The panel has voted to deny the 
petition for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition for 
rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petition for 
rehearing en banc.” Order on Petition for Rehearing at 1, Native Village of 
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2010), No. 09-17490. 
 36. J. Wylie Donald, No En Banc Appeal in Kivalina; So What’s Next for 
Climate Change Litigation?, CLIMATE LAWYERS (Dec. 8, 2012, 10:18 PM), 
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alleging a state law-based public nuisance claim. This approach is 
also unlikely to succeed because the courts will likely conclude that 
the Clean Air Act preempts such claims.37 
In light of these grim realities, the Native Village of Kivalina is in 
a desperate situation. Federal and state laws in the United States do 
not currently authorize an outlay of funds to assist a community like 
Kivalina to relocate proactively before climate change-related 
disaster strikes. Current federal laws authorize relocation for 
communities in the United States only after they have been imperiled 
by a crisis.38 This approach is unworkable in the climate change 
context. “Imminent peril” needs to be the trigger for relocation 
because responding to a crisis caused by climate change impacts after 
it has occurred would involve a significant and unnecessary loss of 
lives.39 Therefore, a climate change relocation fund is necessary to 
fill this remedial gap. 
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR RELOCATION UNDER U.S. LAW 
The international community now widely recognizes that large-
scale population displacement due to climate change is impending 
and requires international cooperation. Unfortunately, the United 
States has played a marginal role at best in international climate 
change negotiations and is reluctant to subject itself to any binding 
commitments related to climate change adaptation. Therefore, 
proactive intervention to establish funding for permanent relocation 
for vulnerable federally recognized tribes in the United States is 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.climatelawyers.com/post/2012/12/08/No-En-Banc-Appeal-in-
Kivalina3b-So-Whats-Next.aspx. On May 20, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court 
denied Kivalina’s petition for writ of certiorari. See Jessica M. Karmasek, U.S. SC 
Denies Alaskan Village’s Petition for Review of Global Warming Case, LEGAL 
NEWSLINE (May 20, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/global-
warming/241681-u-s-sc-denies-alaskan-villages-petition-for-review-of-global-
warming-case. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See infra Part II for a discussion of two such federal laws. 
 39. The standard for demonstrating the injury-in-fact element of standing 
provides support for this imminent peril theory. Federal courts have concluded that 
plaintiffs’ asserted injury to establish standing can be either actual or imminent. 
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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essential to safeguard the culture and livelihood of these 
communities. 
This section of the paper explores existing federal mechanisms for 
relocation as possible foundations for this new fund. Federal law 
addressing permanent relocation as a remedy for climate change 
displacement does not exist in the United States. A permanent 
relocation remedy is available in limited circumstances under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA),40 where exposure to hazardous waste 
contamination necessitates the relocation of residents premised on a 
cost-benefit analysis. Unlike the protections available under 
CERCLA, there is no mandate that protects the residents of Kivalina 
and similarly situated federally recognized tribes requiring 
responsible parties to pay to guard against the citizens’ loss of 
homeland. 
A climate change fund to assist in the relocation of federally 
recognized tribes that require relocation due to climate change 
impacts could be established in a variety of formats.41 Two 
significant federal frameworks that address relocation, CERCLA and 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), are discussed 
in this section to illustrate how narrow and rare the remedy of 
permanent relocation is under federal law. 
A. CERCLA 
In response to the Love Canal disaster and to protect the public 
from the dangers of hazardous waste contamination, Congress 
enacted CERCLA in 1980.42 CERCLA was enacted to implement a 
systematic process for identifying and responding to contaminated 
sites backed by the largest environmental fund in the history of the 
United States, the revenues for which were generated by taxpayers 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
 41. There are several funds in place at the federal and state levels that provide a 
useful framework for determining the characteristics of a climate relocation fund. 
See infra Part IV. 
 42. Daryl Dworkin, Love Canal and the Superfund—30 Years Later, EXAMINER 
(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/love-canal-and-the-superfund-
30-years-later. 
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and the polluters themselves.43 An integral component of this 
statutory scheme was the Hazardous Substance Superfund 
[hereinafter Superfund] that Congress created as part of CERCLA to 
compensate state and federal governments if the responsible parties 
cannot be identified or are unable to undertake such activities 
themselves in hazardous waste site cleanups.44 Taxes generated from 
the chemical and petroleum industries that benefit from producing 
contaminating products supplied the Superfund with approximately 
$1.5 billion annually.45 
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it intended to make the 
polluters pay for the cost of cleaning up these sites and instituted the 
tax to achieve this end. Moreover, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) seeks to hold those parties who contributed to the 
contamination responsible for the cost of CERCLA cleanups.46 Such 
parties may be asked to help pay for the cleanup of a site even if they 
acted in full accordance with the law “at the time they disposed of the 
waste.”47 
CERCLA was established to ensure that cleanups would continue 
despite the tactics that prolong litigation. When Congress enacted 
CERCLA, it embraced a concept popularized by Western European 
nations where manufacturers and importers of products bear a 
significant degree of responsibility for the environmental impacts 
their products cause throughout the product life cycle.48 The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
includes “upstream impacts inherent in the selection of materials for 
the products, impacts from manufacturers’ production process itself, 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2006). 
 45. This amount was raised to $8.5 billion under the Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) 
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 46. Potentially responsible parties under CERCLA are: (1) past owners or 
operators; (2) current owners or operators; (3) arrangers; and (4) transporters. 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006). 
 47.  OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENFORCEMENT, EPA, SUPERFUND AND 
SMALL WASTE CONTRIBUTORS (2008), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/cleanup/superfund/sm-waste-contrib-rev.pdf. 
 48. See Fact Sheet: Extended Producer Responsibility, ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., (2006), http://www.oecd.org/env/
resourceproductivityandwaste/factsheetextendedproducerresponsibility.htm. 
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and downstream impacts from the use and disposal of the 
products.”49 Similar to CERCLA liability in the United States, 
European producers accept their responsibility when designing their 
products to “minimize life-cycle environmental impacts, and when 
accepting legal, physical or socio-economic responsibility for 
environmental impacts that cannot be eliminated by design,”50 
highlighting the “abnormally dangerous activity”51 context 
fundamental to CERCLA. 
In 1995, Congress allowed the Superfund tax to expire, and the 
trust balance fell from $3.8 billion in 1996 to zero in 2003.52 “Instead 
of polluters paying, the U.S. Treasury has since subsidized cleanups, 
and financial allocation to Superfund has dramatically fallen.”53 A 
sharp decline in Superfund cleanups has resulted from reduced 
funding and fewer initiated cleanups, as well as a slower rate of 
completion. For example, the EPA completed eighty-nine cleanups in 
1999, but a mere nineteen in 2009.54 
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to permanently relocate residences 
and businesses as a remedy when it would be more cost effective 
than the process and expense of securing health and safety if such 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. “Abnormally dangerous activity” is a term of art, and has been defined in 
the following manner: 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the 
following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of 
risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; (b) 
likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to 
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which 
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of 
the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its 
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 52. Braunson Virjee, Stimulating the Future of Superfund: Why the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act Calls for a Reinstatement of the Superfund Tax to 
Polluted Sites in Urban Environments, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 27, 27 
(2010). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Juliet Eilperin, Obama, EPA to Push for Restoration of Superfund Tax on 
Oil, Chemical Companies, WASH. POST (June 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/20/
AR2010062001789.html. 
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residences and businesses were to remain located near the hazardous 
waste disposal site.55 EPA’s decision to authorize permanent 
relocation as a remedy under CERCLA was established in response 
to concerns regarding the need to limit relocation as a remedy to only 
temporary relocations while cleanup efforts were undertaken near 
Superfund sites. However, after years of considering the cost of 
permanent relocation as compared to the cost of remediating the 
environment so that it is fit for residential life, EPA’s “National 
Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy”56 was established in 
July 1999. 
The interim relocation policy applies only to remedial actions at 
National Priorities List (NPL) sites; it does not apply to removal 
actions.57 All CERCLA cleanups, regardless of who undertakes them, 
are governed by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances 
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP),58 which identifies the steps for 
identifying and investigating sites presumed to contain hazardous 
material. The NCP also evaluates possible strategies for remediation 
and determines the actual cleanup encompassing both removal and 
remediation efforts. In order for a state or the EPA to recover for 
response actions, their actions must be “not inconsistent” with the 
NCP, whereas all other parties must show that their actions were 
“consistent” with the NCP.59 
                                                                                                                 
 55. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
§ 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2012); 
Memorandum on Interim Policy on the Use of Permanent Relocations as Part of 
Superfund Remedial Actions from Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Assistant Adm’r, 
EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, to Superfund National 
Policy Managers, Regions I–X & Regional Counsels, Regions I–X, (June 30, 
1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/relocation/intpol.pdf 
[hereinafter Memorandum on Interim Policy]. 
 56. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 
37012. 
 57. Id. at 37012. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)–(24). (The term “removal” 
includes and makes recoverable the costs of temporary evacuation and relocation 
whereas the term “remedial action” includes and makes recoverable the costs of 
permanent relocations of residents, businesses and community facilities if the 
President has determined that relocation is cost-effective and environmentally 
preferable to other options.). 
 58. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2013). 
 59. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
§§ 107(a)(4)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2006). 
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A landmark case in relocation as a remedy for hazardous waste 
contamination under CERCLA occurred in Escambia County, 
Florida. The Escambia Wood Treating Company, a 26-acre facility, 
is an abandoned wood preserving facility that operated from 1942 
until closing in 1982. The company discharged spent creosote and 
PCB-laden waste into unlined holding ponds at the location during 
operation before the facility closed in 1982. In October 1991, the 
EPA began a removal action to excavate contaminated materials. The 
excavated material is currently stockpiled under a secure cover on-
site.60 
In April 1996, the EPA permanently relocated sixty-six families as 
part of a remedial action involving the excavation and removal of 
dioxin-contaminated soil in Pensacola, Florida. Residents near the 
Escambia Wood Treating Superfund site believed that more than 300 
families should have been relocated. After a great deal of 
controversy, the EPA decided in February 1997 to permanently 
relocate 358 families and to clean up the contaminated property to 
levels that would be protective for industrial use.61 
Courts have held that a plaintiff is not required to obtain prior 
presidential approval under CERCLA to recover costs of temporary 
relocation.62 The Tenth Circuit in Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.63 
addressed whether presidential approval is a prerequisite to recovery 
of costs for all types of permanent relocations.64 Given the concern 
for efficient use of resources expressed in the statute and the 
overwhelmingly expensive prospect of permanently relocating 
residents, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the requirement of 
presidential approval should apply not only to permanent relocations 
to protect residents from exposure, but also to permanent relocations 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Escambia Wood—Pensacola, EPA REGION 4: SUPERFUND, http://www.epa.
gov/region4/superfund/sites/npl/florida/escwprefl.html (last updated July 23, 2013). 
For a discussion of the Escambia scenario, see generally Steve Lerner, Pensacola, 
Florida: Living Next Door to Mount Dioxin and a Chemical Fertilizer Superfund 
Site, COLLABORATIVE ON HEALTH & THE ENV’T (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.
healthandenvironment.org/articles/homepage/2628. 
 61. See Memorandum on Interim Policy, supra note 55, at 2. 
 62. See, e.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 419–20 (M.D. Pa. 
1989). 
 63. Colorado v. Idarado Min. Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990). 
 64. Id. at 1498–99. 
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necessary to construct remedial facilities.65 To date, claims seeking 
additional living expenses in relocation cases such as post-relocation 
increased rent, utility expenses, and commuting charges have not 
been successful.66 Therefore, permanent relocation under CERCLA 
is a rare and limited remedy.67 
B. FEMA 
Government agencies play a critical role in hazard mitigation and 
disaster relief, from rebuilding destroyed infrastructure to aiding 
residents displaced from their homes. The process is cumbersome 
and the relationships between various government actors, from the 
local to the national levels, can be complex to a degree that residents 
in need of assistance remain helpless. The primary focus of the U.S. 
government today is a short-term, reactive approach: wait for disaster 
and then try to clean it up. This approach is woefully inadequate, 
however, to protect those citizens who can never return to their 
homes after disaster strikes, such as the residents of Native Village of 
Kivalina after coastal erosion makes their current location 
uninhabitable. 
The United States has an existing framework that addresses long-
term mitigation and adaptation strategies necessary to confront 
                                                                                                                 
 65. Id. at 1499. 
 66. See, e.g., Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
 67. A recent consent decree entered under the Clean Water Act offers some 
hope, however, for the proactive relocation approach that would be necessary to 
implement the climate change relocation fund proposed in this article. On March 
19, 2013, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana 
entered a consent decree to resolve a citizen suit brought by the Louisiana 
Environmental Action Network. Order, La. Envtl. Action Network v. City of Baton 
Rouge, No. 10-cv-187 (M.D. La. Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://www.tulane.
edu/~telc/assets/pdfs/3-19-13_ConsntDecree-BR_Sewer.pdf. By the terms of the 
consent decree, the City of Baton Rouge agreed to (1) create a buffer zone around 
its North Wastewater Treatment Plant by relocating more than forty households 
from a predominantly minority, low-income community, (2) pay fair market value 
for affected homes without regard to the proximity of the sewage treatment plant, 
and (3) comply with the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies Act, including provisions for paying for moving expenses, 
providing replacement housing expenses when necessary to get residents into 
“decent, safe, and sanitary” homes, and ensuring that no person be displaced before 
Baton Rouge makes “comparable replacement dwellings” available. Id. 
24 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXV 
gradually displaced communities. In 2003, the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) determined that flooding and erosion 
affect 184 indigenous villages and specifically that four of them 
faced imminent threats of disaster—Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok, and 
Shishmaref.68 In 2009, the GAO issued a second report finding that 
number had tripled and now twelve communities face imminent 
destruction, and yet no discussion had begun on a strategy to mitigate 
the ensuing consequences of flooding and coastal erosion.69 The 
report highlighted general governance issues and explained that no 
government agency at this time has the necessary authority to 
relocate communities.70 This regulatory gap is primarily due to the 
fact that no governmental organization exists that can address the 
strategic planning needs of relocation, and no funding is specifically 
designated for relocation.71 
Only temporary relocation assistance is currently available from 
FEMA to victims of a limited number of enumerated natural 
disasters. Federal programs to assist threatened villages to prepare for 
such disasters and to protect and relocate them are limited and 
unavailable without certain qualifying elements that the Alaskan 
villages do not meet.72 Although other federal agencies, such as 
Housing and Urban Development, have limited temporary relocation 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, 4. 
 69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-551, LIMITED PROGRESS 
HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND 
EROSION (2009). 
 70. Id. at 27–28. 
 71. Id. at 20–22. 
 72. Mitigation planning under FEMA is only available to Indian tribal 
governments. FEMA regulations define “Indian tribal government” as: 
[A]ny Federally recognized governing body of an Indian or Alaska 
Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the 
Secretary of Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the 
Federally Recognized Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a. This does 
not include Alaska Native corporations, the ownership of which is 
vested in private individuals.” Therefore, many Native Alaskan 
communities imperiled by climate change impacts are ineligible even for 
this temporary relocation assistance. 
See 44 C.F.R. § 201 (2013). 
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funding available, there is no comprehensive proactive federal 
program to assist communities with permanent relocation.73 
FEMA is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland 
Security, initially created by the Presidential Reorganization Plan of 
197874 and implemented by Executive Order.75 The goal of FEMA 
was to streamline the process of responding to a disaster so an 
effective, coordinated effort could be undertaken. FEMA is not 
equipped to address long-term gradual displacement, however. 
Apart from providing a national defense, responding to national 
catastrophes is arguably the preeminent role of a central government. 
Before FEMA became an independent agency, the U.S. 
government’s response to disasters was a disjointed process executed 
by multiple agencies pursuant to various statutes. Prior to FEMA, 
each individual aspect of recovery had to be implemented by the 
appropriate agency, which involved more than 100 agencies.76 For 
example, in the event of a crisis, the Bureau of Public Roads77 
financed the reconstruction of highways and roads; the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, acting under authority of the Flood Control Act 
of 1944,78 controlled the flooding and irrigation aspects of recovery; 
and the Housing and Home Finance Agency handled loss of homes 
and displacement of families. A single comprehensive strategy was 
necessary to meet the nation’s disaster response needs. FEMA is the 
federal government’s attempt to consolidate these several functions. 
FEMA’s primary purpose is to coordinate the response to a disaster 
that has occurred in the United States and that overwhelms the 
resources of local and state authorities.79 In addition to response, 
FEMA provides incentives to states to construct infrastructure that 
                                                                                                                 
 73. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 24. 
 74. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41943 (Sept. 19, 1978) 
(establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and providing for the 
transfer of functions and the transfer and abolition of agencies and offices). 
 75. Exec. Order No. 12127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19367 (Mar. 31, 1979). 
 76. About the Agency, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.
gov/about-agency (last visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 77. The Bureau of Public Roads was under the direction of the Department of 
Transportation and the predecessor to the Federal Highway Administration. See 
generally NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION LIBRARY, http://ntl.bts.gov. 
 78. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (2006); 33 C.F.R. § 222 (2013). 
 79. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
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will prevent disasters. The governor of the state in which the disaster 
occurs must complete a report indicating a state of emergency and 
formally request from the President that FEMA and the federal 
government respond to the disaster.80 Once the report is received, the 
President then makes a Declaration of an Emergency and is allowed 
to send emergency funds to state and local organizations to save lives 
and protect property. Total assistance provided in a given declared 
emergency may not exceed five million dollars.81 This amount is a 
fraction of the costs required to permanently relocate the tiny Native 
Village of Kivalina. 
Three types of federal assistance are made available to the long-
term rehabilitation of an area and its citizens after a disaster.82 
Individual assistance is given, upon application, to individuals, 
families, farmers, and businesses in the form of loans, grants, 
emergency housing, tax relief, and unemployment assistance.83 
Public assistance funds are granted to states, local communities, and 
nonprofit groups to restore public systems and facilities.84 Finally, 
matching mitigation funds are set up for states and local communities 
to initiate projects to eliminate or reduce an area’s vulnerability to a 
hazard.85 This federal assistance to state and local governments may 
include the provision of equipment, supplies, facilities, and 
personnel; technical assistance; loans; and sometimes grants.86 
Relocation assistance under the FEMA framework is purely 
temporary and is limited to victims of certain natural catastrophes 
enumerated in the Stafford Act, such as hurricanes, tornados, and 
                                                                                                                 
 80. The only exception to the state’s gubernatorial declaration occurs when an 
emergency takes place on federal property or to a federal asset, for example, the 
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. See generally The Declaration Process, FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY: http://www.fema.gov/declaration-process (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2013). 
 81. 42 U.S.C. § 5193 (2006). 
 82. UNIV. OF FLA. INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC. SCIS., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
IN A DISASTER, THE DISASTER HANDBOOK § 3.7, at 4 (National ed. 1998), 
http://disaster.ifas.ufl.edu/pdfs/chap03/d03-07.pdf. 
 83. Id. at 6–8. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. 44 C.F.R. § 206.5 (2013). 
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earthquakes.87 Drought is the only gradual ecological process listed 
in the statute as a potential catalyst for a presidential disaster 
declaration. One of the most significant hazards faced by Alaskan 
coastal communities—erosion—is not included in the list of major 
disasters in the Stafford Act.88 
Based on FEMA’s written manual, it appears that the United States 
has developed a comprehensive scheme to handle and prevent 
domestic crisis. From a practical perspective, however, FEMA has 
endured periods of harsh criticism, with none greater than that in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina. The response to Katrina and the failure to 
find permanent housing for the displaced residents underscores the 
reality that the U.S. government’s primary disaster relief framework 
is ineffective and insufficient in scope.89 
Relocation assistance is also available outside of CERCLA and 
FEMA in the limited contexts of witness protection and eminent 
domain. The United States Federal Witness Security program is 
administered by the U.S Department of Justice and operated by the 
U.S. Marshals Service. The program is designed to protect threatened 
witnesses before, during, and after a trial.90 The Witness Security 
Program was authorized by the Organized Crime Control Act of 
197091 and amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1984.92 The U.S. Marshals have protected and relocated almost 
                                                                                                                 
 87. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006). See enabling regulations enacted under FEMA, 44 
C.F.R. §§ 206.31–206.48 (2009). 
 88. Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an 
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Memorandum from Bobby Weaver, Operations Chief, Harrison County Incident 
Mgmt. Team, to the Exec. Comm. Members of the Harrison County Incident 
Mgmt. Team (Apr. 7, 2006) (on file with author). 
 90. Witness Security Program, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.
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 91. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006)). 
 92. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 
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10,000 individuals and families since the program began in 1971.93 
Witnesses and their families typically get new identities with 
authentic documentation. Housing, subsistence for basic living 
expenses, and medical care are provided to the witnesses. Job 
training and employment assistance may also be provided. 
In the eminent domain context, the federal or state government will 
assist an individual or family to vacate and move somewhere else. 
Under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property 
Acquisition Policies Act, the federal government or a state agency 
will provide moving and related expenses, replacement housing for 
homeowners including mortgage insurance, replacement housing for 
tenants, relocation planning, and last resort housing replacement by 
the federal government.94 
Therefore, federally recognized tribes imperiled by climate change 
impacts cannot secure assistance from any of these existing programs 
to address their plight. A climate change relocation fund would build 
on the logic of these permanent relocation opportunities under U.S. 
law to provide meaningful support to communities like the Native 
Village of Kivalina. 
III.  COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON RELOCATION AND 
CLIMATE ADAPTATION ASSISTANCE 
To provide further conceptual support for a polluter-financed 
climate change relocation fund in the United States, it is useful to 
consider related initiatives in other nations. While the United States 
offers little in relocation assistance, other nations have explored 
funding relocation initiatives to proactively promote important 
objectives such as public safety and economic efficiency. In addition, 
other nations have developed climate adaptation funds that are 
financed by private sector contributions. 
Relocation initiatives to proactively safeguard public safety have 
been undertaken within the past decade in Taiwan, Japan, and 
Vanuatu. In 2004, communities in Taipei, Taiwan at high risk of 
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 94. 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (2006); 49 C.F.R.§ 24.1 et seq. (2013). 
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perilous landslides were relocated to safety.95 Taipei Mayor Ma 
Ying-jeou promised to relocate two communities as soon as the 
resources became available. The mayor was criticized by his 
constituents for only relocating two of the thirty hillside communities 
listed at risk of falling victim to landslides.96 The mayor accepted 
fault and petitioned the central government for funds to aid his 
constituents and the communities of nearby Sanchong City. 
Similarly, in March 2010, a small community in Japan located on 
the coast of Numazu, Shizuoka Prefecture applied to the government 
for subsidies to relocate to higher ground after the tsunami in the 
Tohoku region last year.97 Residents of the district applied for 
subsidies from the central government under a program designed to 
facilitate mass relocations in areas struck by disasters or under threat 
of disasters.98 While subsidies for permanent relocation are unusual, 
nothing in the public program expressly denies it. The residents have 
asked the city to build a coastal levee twelve meters high and 150 
meters long, but some community and city leaders believe the cost-
benefit analysis would favor relocation.99 The topic is open for 
debate by all sides and, most importantly, the local and national 
governments support such conversations and seek to offer assistance 
for the health and safety of their residents. 
Finally, in Vanuatu, the Canadian government provided funding to 
relocate 100 villagers on Tegua Island in 2005. The relocation was 
necessary because frequent flooding and erosion due to sea level rise 
had made the original settlement uninhabitable.100 
In Australia, proactive relocation has also been engaged as a means 
of promoting the economic interests of its residents by balancing 
labor shortages in some areas and rising populations in other areas. 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Ma to Relocate Hillside Homes at Risk of Landslide, CHINA POST (Taipei 
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 97. Shizuoka Coastal Hamlet Eyes Higher Ground, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo), 
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Community management committees have begun discussions within 
their own networks about the growing frustration of high 
unemployment in their communities due to population growth.101 The 
population in these areas has grown rapidly due to the influx of 
Sudanese and other African refugees. A team of academics and 
statisticians conducted a study of relocating a number of refugee 
communities in Melbourne to a less densely populated area of 
Victoria, another province in the country.102 
Funded by both public resources and private consortiums, the goal 
of the relocation initiative was to alleviate high unemployment in the 
overpopulated province of Melbourne, and bolster the southwestern 
region of Victoria, which was suffering from a low-skilled worker 
shortage.103 Upon agreement to work in Victoria, families were 
offered relocation packages, mainly funded by the private entities for 
which the individuals would work. The relocation package consisted 
of two months’ rent, utilities, transportation costs relevant to the 
identified needs of the family as assessed by the Migrant Liaison 
Officer, and support to access education, employment, housing, 
health, and community services.104 Families accepting this package 
also had to make a commitment as part of their agreement for at least 
one adult member of each family to be employed within one month 
of arrival, secure private housing, and plan to settle permanently in 
the area. 
The study found that the migrant workers were pleased with the 
new employment, which afforded them the labor protections that all 
Australian workers enjoy. The study and analysis concluded by 
recommending that other cities and provinces engage in similar 
policies to balance overpopulation and work shortages. 
The United States has the resources and the technology to engage 
in such dialogue and responses, but disjointed governance has 
ultimately led to only reactive initiatives, evidenced by the FEMA 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Robyn Broadbent et al., A Tale of Two Communities: Refugee Relocation in 
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 102. Id. at 582–83. 
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framework and the lack of proactive measures and relocation 
assistance for those permanently affected by natural disturbances. 
Climate change adaptation funds in other countries are another 
dimension of support for a climate change relocation fund in the 
United States For example, in Brazil, the National Fund on Climate 
Change was enacted in 2010, which uses funds from a tax on 
domestic oil production profits to support a fund to address climate 
change mitigation and adaptation.105 Similarly, in the Philippines, the 
People’s Survival Fund was enacted in 2012, which established a 
special trust fund for financing climate change adaptation programs 
and projects to help make communities more resilient to climate-
induced disasters.106 These funds—one privately funded and the 
other government-funded—provide support for the implementation 
of a climate change relocation fund in the United States. 
Therefore, there is ample precedent in other nations for proactive 
relocation assistance and for the financing of a climate change 
adaptation fund. These two contexts of support must be properly 
integrated to propose an effective climate change relocation fund in 
the United States. Part IV of the article addresses these challenges. 
IV.  PROPOSAL FOR A CLIMATE CHANGE RELOCATION FUND IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Establishing a government-administered fund to assist residents in 
need of climate change relocation assistance is a form of “distributive 
justice.”107 Distributive justice addresses how to properly allocate 
goods, such as taxpayer dollars, within a society. A true distributive 
justice fund is funded solely by taxpayer dollars, rather than by the 
wrongdoers who created the compensable harm.108 Though this 
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distributive justice model represents a departure from the traditional 
American legal system, which embraces the “polluter pays” objective 
that parties responsible for harm should pay the costs associated with 
such harm, the “polluter pays” system of justice is difficult to 
administer in the context of harms caused by climate change. Proof 
of causation can be extremely difficult in cases where a victim is 
attempting to hold a company liable for releasing greenhouse gases 
that contribute to climate change because there are thousands of 
companies worldwide emitting the same pollutants into the 
atmosphere, and these emissions do not recognize territorial 
boundaries of states. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint 
which companies’ pollutants are the cause of the harm that occurred. 
Therefore, distributive justice becomes a necessary remedy for the 
victims of climate change who may be left with little or no potential 
for compensation. However, like CERCLA, this distributive justice 
model can be a hybrid of both general taxpayer contributions and 
enhanced contributions from private sector entities that contribute a 
substantial amount of greenhouse gas emissions to the global climate 
change problem. As such, this model represents a hybrid of the 
“polluter pays” and the distributive justice models of compensation. 
Four questions must be addressed in proposing a possible 
framework for a climate change relocation fund in the United States. 
First, what sources(s) will provide the revenues to establish and 
sustain the fund? Second, what administrative model should be 
employed for the fund? Third, how will the revenues for the fund be 
generated? Fourth, what segment of the population is the intended 
beneficiary of the fund? This section of the article addresses these 
questions and proposes a polluter-supported funding mechanism 
through mandatory and voluntary contributions that draws on a 
variety of models from related contexts for administering the fund. 
The article proposes that the sole beneficiaries of the fund should be 
federally recognized tribes. 
The first question is relatively straightforward. Major emitters of 
greenhouse gases should be the principal source of revenues for the 
fund. Consistent with the “polluter pays principle,” a formula could 
be used to determine a minimum threshold of annual emissions of 
greenhouse gases in the private sector to be eligible for inclusion in 
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the fund’s mandatory contributions.109 The polluter pays principle is 
engrained in U.S. and international environmental policy. Principle 
16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development conveys 
the principle as follows: “National authorities should endeavor to 
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of 
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the 
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution . . . .”110 
This principle is also reflected in several provisions of U.S. 
environmental law. For example, section 120(a) of the Clean Air Act 
assesses a penalty against polluters who are not in compliance with 
the statute based on the “economic value of the noncompliance,” and 
CERCLA allows the government and individuals to sue polluters for 
cleanup costs even if the pollution was caused long before CERCLA 
was enacted.111 Requiring participation in the fund from those 
substantially contributing to and benefiting from the harm associated 
with climate change is the fairest approach.112 The more challenging 
questions are the administrative model to employ, the method of 
generating the revenue, and the intended beneficiaries of the fund. 
A.   Possible Models for the Fund 
Potential models for the fund at the federal level are the Victim 
Compensation Fund of 2001 and the BP Oil Spill Fund. One 
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dimension of the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th 
was the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act 
(ATSSSA). One of the key components of ATSSSA is the 
“September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001” (the Victim 
Compensation Fund).113 The Victim Compensation Fund was created 
after a horrific tragedy occurred. The purpose of the fund is to 
provide no-fault compensation to the victims and families of the 
victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks.114 In addition to 
providing compensation, the fund was established to protect the 
airline industry from the prospect of an overwhelming number of 
individual claims in the court system, which could potentially 
devastate the airline industry’s finances and reputation. 
Rather than a board of trustees, a single individual was given the 
task of managing the Victim Compensation Fund. Kenneth Feinberg 
was appointed Special Master of the fund. He traveled extensively to 
meet with families and victims to determine their eligibility and the 
amount they would receive.115 The fund established a set formula for 
distributing funds to victims and families of victims to promote 
equality that included: (1) non-economic loss; (2) economic loss; and 
(3) collateral sources of income such as insurance, workers 
compensation, and social security payments to be deducted.116 Non-
economic loss was awarded as a flat rate for everyone: $250,000 for 
the dead victim and $100,000 for each spouse or dependent.117 
Economic loss was configured based on the deceased’s earnings at 
the time of death and potential future earnings depending on 
education and current circumstances.118 
Similarly, a climate change relocation fund should include a clear 
formula for determining compensation to victims. However, the 
formula used should depend on the type of harm caused. In the 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim 
Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 121, 123 (2002). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Peter T. Elikann, Book Review, 90 MASS. L. REV. 48, 48 (2006) (reviewing 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO 
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11). 
 116. Id. at 49. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
2013] CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CLIMATE JUSTICE 35 
Kivalina scenario, each household should receive an amount for 
relocation based on the number of family or household members. A 
flat rate in that situation is the fairest way to approach the extremely 
difficult task of relocating an entire village of people. 
The BP Oil Spill Fund provides another model for a climate 
relocation fund. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) gives the United States 
the ability to designate a “responsible party when an oil spill 
occurs.”119 British Petroleum (BP) was designated the responsible 
party for the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010 that resulted in one of the worst oil spills in history.120 As the 
responsible party, BP is required to establish a procedure for the 
payment or settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.121 
In an effort to comply with the OPA and avoid massive tort litigation, 
BP waived the $75 million limit of liability and created a fund of $20 
billion to pay claims.122 
Kenneth Feinberg, the special master of the Victim Compensation 
Fund, was selected to oversee the distribution of funds and 
processing of claims for the BP oil spill. Unlike the Victim 
Compensation Fund, which was authorized by Congress, the 
authorization for the BP fund is less clear.123 The OPA only states 
that a responsible party must establish a procedure for payment of 
claims, but it does not designate any specific procedure. Moreover, 
the BP Fund was funded exclusively by the party responsible for the 
harm, and was not supplemented by taxpayer dollars. The fund 
arguably provided a better way for victims to receive compensation. 
The conventional tort litigation process is time consuming and 
expensive with no guarantee of compensation. Moreover, the fund 
vastly exceeded the inadequate $75 million liability cap under OPA, 
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which allowed for more victims to be fully compensated for their 
injuries.124 
The BP Fund was created under the auspices of the “Superfund 
myth” created by CERCLA.125 This “Superfund myth” is the idea 
that a trust fund will compensate victims quickly and efficiently 
while avoiding or deferring litigation over the liability of potentially 
responsible parties.126 It is referred to as a “myth” because, 
unfortunately, efficient resolution of claims is not always the 
outcome. For example, the BP fund has denied more claims than it 
has paid out. As of March 28, 2013, the fund had paid about $10 
billion of the $20 billion placed in the fund.127 Despite the seemingly 
large amount paid from the fund to date, many claims were denied 
due to lack of documentation proving causation.128 OPA designates a 
proximate cause requirement for causation. Many of the denied 
claims were likely unable to show proximate cause because they 
could not prove that the damage was caused by the BP oil spill and 
not the result of Hurricane Katrina, effects from which the region was 
still experiencing.129 
The BP fund could provide a framework for a climate change 
relocation fund. In the climate change context, however, identifying 
responsible parties will be much more difficult than it is in the oil 
pollution context. It is much easier to show causation of a spill from a 
specific source than the causes and contributors of severe changes in 
climate conditions over time from the emission of greenhouse gases, 
especially when the greenhouse gases are emitted worldwide by 
thousands of different sources. Given the causation challenges 
involved in the BP oil spill context, the chance of a victim adequately 
proving causation in the climate change context would be virtually 
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impossible. Even if the plaintiffs in the Kivalina case had been able 
to overcome the procedural hurdles of standing and the political 
question doctrine, they would face the daunting obstacle of 
establishing causation at trial and likely ultimately fail in their case. 
Nevertheless, the precedent of a fund, like the BP Oil Spill Fund, 
to compensate for environmental harms can still provide a valuable 
foundation for a climate change relocation fund. If the regulated 
community is forced to bear the costs of the fund through carbon 
taxes or premiums on greenhouse gas emissions, then the issue of 
who is responsible will be moot. All claims will be paid directly from 
the fund without the need to investigate which parties should bear the 
blame, which was part of the challenge in the plaintiffs’ theory of the 
case in selecting the twenty-two largest private emitters of 
greenhouse gases in the United States. This approach will also 
alleviate issues of further litigation between potential defendants 
regarding contribution and indemnification, which has been an issue 
in the CERCLA and BP oil spill distribution of funds. 
Another possible model for a climate change relocation fund is the 
Alaska Permanent Fund. After construction of the Alaska pipeline 
began in 1974, Alaska voters approved an amendment to Alaska’s 
Constitution establishing the Alaska Permanent Fund.130 The fund 
was created to “provide a means of conserving a portion of the state’s 
revenue from mineral resources to benefit all generations of 
Alaskans” with the goal of maintaining “safety of principal while 
maximizing total return” and to be used “as a savings device 
managed to allow the maximum use of disposable income from the 
fund for purposes designated by law.”131 
The financial resources for the Alaska Permanent Fund are derived 
from “at least [twenty-five] percent of all mineral lease rentals, 
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, and federal mineral revenue sharing 
payments and bonuses received by the state.”132 That money is then 
invested in a diversified portfolio of public and private asset classes 
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that are expected to produce income with some acceptable level of 
risk.133 
To date, most of the realized earnings have been distributed to 
Alaska citizens in the form of a dividend, but such earnings could 
potentially be used to help fund the relocation efforts of Alaska 
natives facing the loss of their land from climate change impacts. The 
earnings could also be used on projects that help mitigate or adapt to 
the effects of climate change. Relocation efforts and mitigation or 
adaptation projects promote the fund’s ultimate goal of preserving 
the resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans because it will 
potentially sustain large populations of ancestors and significant 
tracts of land for future generations to enjoy the diversity of cultures 
and natural resources that Alaska offers. 
The fund also established the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation 
(APFC) to manage the fund’s investments. The APFC is run by a six-
member board of trustees appointed by the governor that meets six 
times per year.134 A climate change fund should be administered in a 
similar fashion by an agency created by the federal government, 
perhaps within the Department of Homeland Security. The new 
climate change relocation agency would be tasked with determining 
who is eligible to receive funds and the proper amount of 
compensation. 
B. Methods of Generating Revenue for the Fund 
Contribution to the fund can be enforced by way of a penalty, tax, 
levy, or a permit system. Congress should amend the Clean Air Act 
to include the regulation of carbon dioxide.135 By including carbon 
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dioxide as a criteria air pollutant under the Act, carbon dioxide 
emitters would be subject to the penalties for non-compliance under 
section 120. All, or a specified percentage, of the penalties assessed 
against emitters of carbon dioxide could be deposited into the climate 
change relocation fund. 
Another method to secure revenues for the climate change 
relocation fund is through a carbon tax. According to CNN, “One 
analysis by the Congressional Budget Office says a moderate, $20-
per-ton tax on carbon emissions could raise $1.25 trillion over 10 
years.”136 The tax rate should be based on the marginal cost or the 
“social cost” of carbon dioxide emissions, and imposed on all oil, 
coal, and natural gas production in the United States.137 
Implementation of the tax would occur through existing Internal 
Revenue Service and Energy Department Programs.138 
A carbon tax would generate revenue and potentially reduce the 
amount of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere over time. As 
long as the tax is slightly higher than the benefits of emitting more 
carbon, emissions are likely to reduce. If the tax does not produce the 
desired reduction in emissions, it can be raised. Moreover, a carbon 
tax credit can be given to those who implement carbon-reducing 
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programs. Either all or a portion of the revenue from a carbon tax 
could be placed in a climate change relocation fund. Even if only a 
portion of the revenues were set aside for the fund, a carbon tax is 
still likely to generate a significant amount of funding to be set aside 
for those in dire need of relocation assistance. 
Another way to generate revenue for the fund is through a permit 
system, or cap and trade model. Once a limit on carbon emissions per 
year is established, permits can be auctioned off each year to 
emitters. The permits can then be traded on the private market.139 The 
government will only receive revenue from the permits at their initial 
auction. A price per carbon ton will have to be established, much like 
the carbon tax system allowing emitters to purchase carbon emissions 
at their stated auction value and then trade them for a higher amount 
in the private market. Companies in violation of their permit will be 
assessed a fine that could also be placed in the climate change 
adaptation fund. 
Another model to promote corporate responsibility while 
protecting the populations that are particularly vulnerable to climate 
change impacts is the Price-Anderson Act. This Act provides no-fault 
insurance to benefit the public in the event of a nuclear power plant 
accident that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission deems to be an 
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence.”140 The industry bears the cost of 
the insurance, which is pooled together in a fund to be disbursed in 
the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The industry bears 
the costs by paying an annual premium to cover nuclear reactors. The 
fund has over $12 billion in insurance to cover a potential nuclear 
event.141 This protection consists of two tiers of insurance payouts. 
The first tier provides $375 million in liability coverage per incident. 
If the $375 million is insufficient to cover the costs, the second tier 
allows additional coverage of up to $12.6 billion.142 
The Act has proven so successful that Congress has used the Act’s 
insurance fund as a model for legislation to protect the public against 
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potential losses or harm from other hazards, including faulty 
vaccinations, medical malpractice, and toxic waste.143 This type of 
fund could work well in the climate change context. Industries 
emitting greenhouse gases could bear the costs of funding by having 
to pay premiums for all emissions. The funds would then be pooled 
together as insurance protection to benefit the public in the event of 
an “extraordinary climate change scenario.” It is critical for any 
climate change relocation fund to prescribe in detail the types of 
“extraordinary climate change scenario” that would be covered, 
which could be limited to the need for permanent relocation. 
C.   Role of Indigenous Sovereignty and the Federal Trust 
Relationship 
The final dimension of the implementation of the proposed climate 
change relocation fund is to determine to whom it applies. Climate 
change impacts all of society to varying degrees; therefore, the need 
to narrow the applicability of the fund is essential to ensure its 
viability. The fund is meant to provide a complete remedy to 
communities that face an imminent need for relocation and cannot 
fund their relocation costs. Kivalina is a case study of this degree of 
vulnerability and it is on this foundation that the fund should be 
oriented. Kivalina is among the first of many indigenous 
communities throughout the United States that will need to be 
relocated within the next few decades because climate change 
impacts will render their homeland uninhabitable. 
Why should the fund be limited to federally recognized tribes 
when other indigenous communities that are not federally recognized 
may be equally deserving, as well as other non-indigenous 
communities? The answer lies in the federal trustee relationship that 
exists between the U.S. government and federally recognized tribes. 
The United States is obligated by treaty to simultaneously protect 
federally recognized tribes and recognize their inherent sovereignty 
to manage their own affairs.144 Recognition of these tribes’ 
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sovereignty involves respecting the realities of how climate change 
can disrupt and destroy a tribe’s cultural and spiritual ties to its 
traditional lands. A need for relocation must therefore be 
administered on a sensitive government-to-government basis between 
the United States and these tribes to ensure that they are adequately 
protected and that their traditions are preserved to the maximum 
degree possible in finding a suitable new community for relocation. 
Federal environmental law embraces this special government-to-
government relationship between the federal government and 
federally recognized tribes. First, Congress recognized the special 
sovereignty of federally recognized tribes by enabling them to apply 
for treatment as state status under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water 
Act to administer permit programs as a state government would on 
their tribal lands.145 Second, Congress recognized the federal trust 
relationship between the federal government and federally 
recognized tribes in granting authority to the President under 
CERCLA § 9626(b) to permanently relocate an Indian tribe or 
Alaska Native village threatened by hazardous waste 
contamination.146 
The climate change relocation fund in this article would be limited 
to federally recognized tribes; however, this proposal does not mean 
that a climate relocation fund cannot eventually be made available to 
other segments of the U.S. population in need of relocation 
assistance. Federally recognized tribes like Kivalina certainly are not 
the only communities in need of relocation assistance and unable to 
pay for those relocation costs. However, these federally recognized 
tribes are first in line for this assistance because of the federal 
government’s trust relationship with these tribes, and the climate 
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change relocation fund must be administered with that reality in 
mind. Other forms of assistance, such as grants and loans, may be 
available to affected communities other than federally recognized 
tribes. But as a matter of equity, the U.S. government’s failure to 
adequately regulate climate change has betrayed the health, safety, 
and cultural integrity of federally recognized tribes above all others 
in this country as these communities now hang precariously at the tip 
of the spear of devastating climate change impacts. 
CONCLUSION 
There is ample foundation in U.S. law and in the laws of other 
nations to develop a climate change relocation assistance fund. 
Existing models for climate relocation assistance under federal law 
offer promise, but have severe limitations in their current form. 
FEMA assistance is only eligible to only those whose pre-disaster 
primary residences are rendered uninhabitable as the result of a major 
disaster. The Native Village of Kivalina has not been rendered 
uninhabitable as of this writing. Therefore, residents would have to 
wait for disaster to strike before they are eligible for assistance under 
FEMA. Moreover, the maximum amount of assistance available to 
individuals and or families is $25,000. Estimated costs of relocation 
for Kivalina have ranged between $100 and $400 million, which is a 
potential average cost of at least $250,000 per individual. FEMA 
assistance does not even come close to providing sufficient 
assistance. 
The United States’ ability to protect its citizens is evidenced by its 
donation of billions of dollars into international climate investment 
funds.147 While these funds are extremely beneficial to the 
developing nations in need of aid from developed nations, they do 
nothing to aid federally recognized tribes in the United States facing 
the devastating loss of their lands as a result of climate change. The 
United States needs to establish a climate change relocation fund 
through any or a combination of the strategies addressed in this 
article. The fund can be supplemented by soliciting donations from 
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multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations by 
providing them with tax credits or other monetary incentives to do so. 
The first step in establishing a possible climate change relocation 
fund is whether the fund should be managed at the state, federal, or 
international level. This article has proposed that such a fund would 
be most effective if administered at the federal level. The structure of 
the fund could resemble the federally created Victim Compensation 
Fund or the defendant-created BP Oil Spill Fund. While certain 
indigenous communities are impacted more severely by climate 
change than others in the United States, the contributors to the 
problem can be found in every state. Moreover, greenhouse gases do 
not respect state territorial boundaries. Greenhouse gas emissions in 
New York are just as likely to have a severe impact on Alaska as 
emissions from Alaska-based sources. 
Like the CERCLA model, funding for a climate change relocation 
fund could come in part from taxpayer dollars, but should come 
primarily from the polluting industries through a carbon tax. A 
carbon tax is the most streamlined and effective way to secure 
resources for such a fund. It promotes the “polluter pays” principle 
by imposing a tax on oil, coal, and natural gas production in the 
United States. The tax would also promote the reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions into the atmosphere by encouraging polluters to 
achieve lower tax costs with lower emissions and by providing tax 
credits for any carbon reduction plans implemented. 
Relocation as a legal remedy for Kivalina under Alaska law also 
may be possible, but difficult without federal aid. Alaska has already 
established a centralized fund of money known as the Alaska 
Permanent Fund. The Alaska Permanent Fund is a good example of 
how states can structure and implement a climate change relocation 
fund. Nevertheless, state funding in Alaska is not nearly adequate to 
cover all of the federally recognized tribes within its sovereign 
borders who need relocation assistance in the face of devastating 
impacts wrought by climate change.148 
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Therefore, a climate change relocation fund should be managed at 
the federal level. The legislation should specify that those eligible for 
compensation from the fund are limited to federally recognized 
tribes. The most severe cases should be given the highest priority, 
similar to the NPL system under CERCLA. The fund can be 
managed by a government-created climate relocation agency, with a 
similar but narrower charge than FEMA’s mandate. 
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